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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the “price puzzle”, the rise in the price level following a contractionary monetary policy shock, 
using monthly US data from 1960 to 2006. Deviating from the standard practice is including commodity prices to 
“solve the puzzle”, our benchmark VAR contains output, prices, the federal funds rate and M1 money stock, while the 
augmented VAR includes the 10-year long bond yield. Splitting the sample at October of 1979, we find very contrasting 
patterns and rationalize them under the changing relationship between money and the funds rate across periods. First, 
the price puzzle is confined to the pre-Volcker period. Second, in the pre-Volcker period the funds rate respond largely 
to their own shocks, while the post-Volcker period witnesses a larger role for output fluctuations. Third, positive output 
shocks are more recently followed by price increases, federal funds hikes, and monetary contractions, very much con-
sistent with the “Taylor rule”. Fourth, the “monetarist experiment” of late 1979-1982 reinforces our basic results: the 
more explicit the reliance on money supply, the less visible the price puzzle becomes. 
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1. Introduction 
The price puzzle, the rise in the aggregate price level in 
response to a contractionary innovation to monetary pol- 
icy, has been well documented in the literature. Vector 
autoregressive (VAR) models typically included com- 
modity prices to solve the price puzzle. [1] had conjec- 
tured that the price puzzle occurs because the Fed has 
information about future inflation that is not contained in 
the VAR. Commodity prices may signal the future direc- 
tion of the economy as shown, for example, by [2]. 
Alternatives to commodity prices have been put for- 
ward as well. [3] finds little correlation between an abil- 
ity to forecast inflation and an ability to resolve the price 
puzzle. [4] agrees that a commodity price index is not 
needed but argues that the omission of the output gap is 
shown to spuriously produce a price puzzle. [5] adds for- 
ward-looking variables and conclude that “the price puz- 
zle is solved.” [6] finds that the price puzzle disappears 
in periods without large shifts in the level of inflation, 
such as 1984-2005. [7] employs long-run restrictions to 
“fix” the price puzzle. 
This paper takes a different route, with a focus on the 
money stock under two markedly contrasting monetary  
policy regimes. The reconsideration of particular time 
periods in the price puzzle context is not new. Our em- 
phasis on money, however, is. [8] propose revisiting the 
role of money in VARs. We conjecture that a monetary 
aggregate, such as M1, should help identify the monetary 
policy shocks. The Federal Reserve on October 6, 1979 
announced several actions, the “change in operating pro- 
cedures”, which placed emphasis on managing the 
growth of bank reserves. The new procedures remained 
in place until October 9, 1982, when Chairman Volcker 
announced that the Fed was going to temporarily place 
less emphasis on M1. 
Our VAR models use monthly data for the US from 
1960 to 2006 and very conventional identification proce- 
dures. We find that the price puzzle is confined to the 
pre-Volcker period, in which an interpretation through 
credibility factors is advanced along with a reexamina- 
tion of the role of money supply in the models. 
2. The Data 
All data in this paper come from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis, Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED), available athttp://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/. 
The original frequency is monthly for all series; no time 
aggregation was needed. For the purpose of replicating  
*We would like to thank, without implicating, José Angelo Divino and 
Walter Enders for helpful comments. 
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the empirical work in this paper, we list in parenthesis 
below the original code of all variables taken from the St. 
Louis FRED database. 
The Industrial Production Index (Y, original code- 
INDPRO); the CPI for all urban consumers, all items (P, 
CPIAUCSL); and the PPI all commodities (PCOM, PPI- 
ACO) are the output and price indexes used. Total Re-
serves Adjusted for Changes in Reserve Requirements 
(TR, TRARR); Non-Borrowed Reserves of Depository 
Institutions (NBRD, BOGNONBR); and M1 Money 
Stock (M1, M1SL) are money measures in billions of US 
dollars. The effective federal funds rate (FF, FED- 
FUNDS) and the 10-year Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate (i10, GS10) are in % per annum. 
After the “Monetarist Experiment of 1979” i10 was 
always higher than FF except right before the 1990-1991 
and 2001 recessions as well as in 2006, right before the 
December 2007-June 2009 period, defined by the NBER 
as the most recent recession in the US. In November of 
2006 the yield curve hit its most inverted point since 
2000. 
Figure 1 combines FF movements with money stock. 
It is clear the positive association until the early 1980s 
and the negative association since then. To avoid uncer- 
tainty and unusually high interest rate volatility, we ex- 
plore the period right before the most recent economic 
downturn. Following [9], we define the pre-Volcker pe- 
riod ranging from 1960:1 to 1979:9 and the post-Volcker 
period ranging from 1979:10 to 2006:9. 
3. The VAR Model 
Following [10,11], we identify monetary policy shocks 
with the disturbance term in: 
  FFt tFF F F t              (1), 
where: FFt is Federal Funds target rate, F is a linear func-
tion, Φt is the information set, and 
FF
t  is a serially un-
correlated shock orthogonal to the elements of Φt. Our 
benchmark VAR model contains four series: y, p, FF, 
and M1. An increase in (one-standard deviation) FF rate 
shock is associated with a contractionary monetary pol- 
icy shock. 
Associated with each equation in the VAR are the 
shocks, which can be interpreted as follows. Techno- 
logical improvements (εy) are the main force underlying 
output changes other than contributions of factor inputs. 
Disturbances to the price level (εp) can be viewed as ex- 
ogenous fluctuations to the prices of goods and services. 
Interest rate shocks (εFF) include permanent disturbances 
to central bank policymaking due to human actions or to 
shifts in general economic efficiency, such as the more 
aggressive FED policymaking in the Volcker-Greenspan 
years1. Finally, innovations to M1 stock (εM1) can be as- 
sociated with fluctuations in money velocity or in the 
technology of financial services. The ordering of vari- 
ables mirrors previous representative studies on the price 
puzzle, such as [11]. 
 
 
Figure 1. The FF (% per annum) and M1 (in billions of USD). 
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Larger scale VARs were also estimated, allowing for 
the reserves market through TR and NBRD. The bench- 
mark  1 t t t tVARZ y ,p , FF ,M1

 implies that FF rate 
responds to current innovations in output and prices in a 
“Taylor rule” fashion: [12]. Money is assumed to respond 
contemporaneously to the federal funds rate. We do not 
restrict the VAR model a priori, which is common prac- 
tice in the price puzzle literature. The augmented model 
2 t t t t tZ y , p , FF ,i10 , M1VAR  takes into account infla- 
tionary expectations and examines 10-year T-Bond in- 
terest rates during the “Volcker disinflation” recorded by 
[13]. 
4. Results 
We apply logarithms to all series, except for interest rates.  
The VARs are estimated with 12 lags. Formal serial cor- 
relation LM tests on the VAR residuals do not reject the 
null that no residual correlation exists at lag order h. 
Correlation coefficients in Table 1 make clear the dis- 
tinctive patterns. First, M1 is positively related to FF in 
the pre-Volcker (0.667) and negatively related to FF in 
the more recent period (–0.854). The latter would be con- 
sistent with an expansionary monetary policy moving the 
funds rate downwards. Second, interest rates (either the 
overnight FF rate or the 10-year T-bond) correlate posi- 
tively (between 0.616 and 0.922) with output and prices 
in the first subsample but negatively (between –0.703 
and –0.904) in the second subsample. Third, prices and 
commodity prices are strongly correlated, as well as 
prices and money stock. 
 
Table 1. Correlation matrices among relevant series for different sample periods. 
 Y P PCOM FF i10 NBRD TR M1 
1960:1-2006:9         
Y 1        
P 0.968 1       
PCOM 0.934 0.982 1      
FF –0.148 –0.156 –0.009 1     
i10 –0.081 –0.023 0.142 0.865 1    
NBRD 0.834 0.910 0.889 –0.214 –0.057 1   
TR 0.835 0.912 0.895 –0.182 –0.025 0.998 1  
M1 0.957 0.988 0.951 –0.253 –0.131 0.941 0.940 1 
         
1960:1-1979:9         
Y 1        
P 0.886 1       
PCOM 0.840 0.992 1      
FF 0.773 0.616 0.590 1     
i10 0.922 0.898 0.862 0.787 1    
NBRD 0.901 0.963 0.938 0.536 0.890 1   
TR 0.947 0.967 0.941 0.675 0.939 0.979 1  
M1 0.939 0.989 0.968 0.667 0.927 0.976 0.991 1 
         
1979:10-2006:9         
Y 1        
P 0.967 1       
PCOM 0.929 0.964 1      
FF –0.703 –0.812 –0.714 1     
i10 –0.854 –0.904 –0.813 0.899 1    
NBRD 0.536 0.682 0.606 –0.750 –0.757 1   
TR 0.518 0.665 0.591 –0.734 –0.737 0.997 1  
M1 0.912 0.975 0.928 –0.854 –0.927 0.812 0.799 1      
 
1Recent work by [12] contains evidence that the US Federal Reserve has become stricter in fighting inflation since 1979, when nominal rates started 
to move up more than proportionately with inflation. 
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Figure 2 reports the impulse responses of the bench- 
mark VAR for the pre-Volcker period. For the impulse 
response functions in Figures 2-5, the responses to Cho- 
lesky one standard deviation innovations (with confi- 
dence bands) are plotted in the y-axis and time (in mon- 
ths) is plotted in the x-axis. Several findings are worth 
exploring. First, in the second row, third column, a per- 
sistent price puzzle exists for up to 20 months. Innova- 
tions in the FF rate have a positive and statistically dif- 
ferent from zero effect on the price level. The variance 
decompositions (VDs) in Table 2 indicate that monetary 
policy shocks explain 36.5% (1 year) and 31.5% (3 years) 
of the variance of prices. Second, monetary policy shocks 
have a negative effect on output at medium horizons. The 
corresponding VDs indicate that FF shocks explain— 
after 3 years—almost half (47.3%) of output variance. 
Third, federal funds shocks explain about 57.8% of the 
variance in the FF rate after 3 years of the shock. Under 
Taylor’s rule, one would expect that a large part of the 
movements in the funds rate respond to output and prices, 
which does not happen here. The response in line 3, col- 
umn 3 of Figure 2 shows a gradually decreasing pattern 
from the 0.4% response on impact. 
Figure 3 displays very different patterns for the post- 
Volcker period. There is no price puzzle now: the short- 
run response of the price level to FF shocks is slightly 
positive. In the long-run, however, increases in FF shocks 
lead to a fall in the price level, as expected. FF innova-
tions explain only 8.25% of the price variance after 3 
years. 
In the post-Volcker period output innovations have 
very strong and persistent effects on FF and on M1. For 
instance, output shocks lead to positive responses of the 
FF rate which persist in the medium run for 20 months. 
VDs indicate that output shocks explain 65.1% of the FF 
variance after 3 years! Also, increases in output shocks 
 
 
Figure 2. Impulse responses of benchmark VAR: Pre-volcker period, 1960:1 to 1979:9. 
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Table 2. Variance decompositions of benchmark VAR Model: X = [Y, P, FF, M1]. 
Innovations  Shocks in Shocks in Shocks in Shocks in 
VDs across Months  Y P FF M1 
Pre-Volcker Period     
Log (Y)     
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 80.36 6.63 11.54 1.47 
 (8.65) (5.78) (6.07) (4.29) 
36 11.64 15.84 47.32 25.20 
 (8.34) (13.73) (15.03) (14.08) 
Log (P)     
1 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.62) (0.62) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 0.77 40.92 36.48 21.84 
 (2.69) (11.76) (11.36) (9.86) 
36 0.57 23.75 31.45 44.23 
 (4.82) (17.45) (14.40) (18.37) 
FF     
1 0.03 0.14 99.83 0.00 
 (0.66) (0.85) (1.06) (0.00) 
12 4.85 4.80 64.57 25.78 
 (5.51) (6.64) (11.74) (11.24) 
36 2.87 6.59 57.82 32.72 
 (4.96) (8.47) (13.42) (13.48) 
Log (M1)     
1 0.02 0.03 0.01  99.94 
 (0.70) (0.66) (0.58) (1.12) 
12 1.16 6.73 16.60 75.51 
 (3.17) (7.22) (9.72) (11.56) 
36 2.96 17.83 56.02 23.19 
 (5.99) (13.80) (17.28) (12.59) 
Post-Volcker Period     
Log (Y)     
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 89.93 4.69 8.60 1.78 
 (7.12) (4.50) (5.68) (3.57) 
36 61.54 10.16 16.45 11.85 
 (13.30) (10.62) (9.45) (10.37) 
Log (P)     
1 0.01 99.99 0.00 0.00 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) 
12 15.87 82.17 1.63 0.33 
 (8.56) (8.88) (2.06) (2.14) 
36 11.74 78.66 8.25 1.35 
 (11.67) (13.41) (6.13) (6.05) 
FF     
1 7.99 0.13 91.88 0.00 
 (2.92) (0.57) (2.91) (0.00) 
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Continued 
12 61.29 0.85 36.25 1.61 
 (8.07) (2.18) (7.29) (2.74) 
36 65.08 4.78 28.08 2.06 
 (9.19) (6.73) (7.31) (4.68) 
Log (M1)     
1 0.12 1.05 0.12 98.72 
 (0.61) (1.24) (0.56) (1.50) 
12 39.15 0.71 5.15 54.99 
 (10.28) (2.47) (4.42) (10.38) 
36 64.62 5.83 1.70 27.85 
 (14.16) (9.58) (3.19) (13.01) 
Notes: The variance decompositions indicate the percentage of the error variance due to each shock during a forecasted horizon at one month, one year, and 




Figure 3. Impulse responses of benchmark var: post-volcker period, 1979: 10 to 2006: 9. 
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Figure 4. Impulse responses of the long-bond inaugmented VARs; Pre-Volcker (1960:1 to 1979:9) Responses; Post-Volcker 
(1979:10 to 2006:9) Responses. 
 
       
Figure 5. Removing the “monetarist experiment” years; Price Responses to FF from 1979:10 to 2006:9; Price Responses to 
FF from 1982:11 to 2006:9. 
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lead to negative responses on the M1 stock, which persist 
throughout the forecasted horizon. Output shocks explain 
64.6% of the variance of M1 after 3 years! In contrast to 
the earlier period, FF shocks now explain only 28.1% of 
their own fluctuations after 3 years. There is a much 
steeper decreasing pattern from the initial 0.6% response. 
When the 10-year bond yields are introduced, the 
augmented VAR for the pre-Volcker period continues to 
show a persistent price puzzle until the 20th month. 
However, the response of i10 to shocks in FF is as fol- 
lows in Figure 4: a positive response at about 0.1% after 
a one standard deviation FF shock that lasts for about 6 
months. This suggests that long-term bonds rise (prices 
fall) after FF innovations, which is consistent with infla- 
tionary expectations remaining high after the contrac- 
tionary monetary policy shock. 
The VDs of i10 explained by FF shocks at 36 months, 
available upon request, arevery much significant for the 
pre-Volcker sample with 26.1% (std. deviation of 10.64). 
Figure 4 for the post-Volcker period shows a close to 
zero response: long-term bonds respond only on impact 
to innovations in FF. 
Figure 5 initially reproduces Figure 3 with no price 
puzzle. If one removes the “monetarist experiment” years, 
however, there is still a price puzzle in the short-run in 
lower Figure 5, while the long-run has a zero response. 
This implies that reliance on monetary aggregates in the 
VAR leads to results in conformity with economic theory 
and away from the price puzzle. 
5. Conclusion 
The correlation between money stock and the FF policy 
instrument has changed remarkably across the two sub- 
periods. Splitting the sample at October of 1979, our 
VARs do indeed find very contrasting patterns. While the 
price puzzle is confined to the pre-Volcker period, posi- 
tive output shocks in the post-Volcker period are fol- 
lowed by price increases, federal funds hikes, and mone- 
tary contractions. We interpret our findings under the 
changing relationship between money and the funds rate 
across periods. First, the price puzzle is confined to the 
pre-Volcker period. Second, in the pre-Volcker period 
the funds rate respond largely to their own shocks, while 
the post-Volcker period witnesses a larger role for output 
fluctuations. Third, positive output shocks are more re- 
cently followed by price increases, federal funds hikes, 
and monetary contractions, very much consistent with 
the “Taylor rule”. Fourth, the “monetarist experiment” of 
late 1979-1982 reinforces our basic results: the more ex- 
plicit the reliance on money supply, the less visible the 
price puzzle becomes. 
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